Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice by Kleinfeld, Joshua
Copyright  2017  by  Joshua Kleinfeld Printed  in  U.S.A. 
Vol.  111,  No.  6 
1455 
THREE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATIC CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 
Joshua Kleinfeld 
ABSTRACT—This Essay links criminal theory to democratic political 
theory, arguing that the view of criminal law and procedure known as 
“reconstructivism” shares a common root with certain culturally oriented 
forms of democratic theory. The common root is the valorization of a 
community’s ethical life and the belief that law and government should 
reflect the ethical life of the community living under that law and 
government. This Essay then specifies three principles that are entailed by 
the union of democracy and reconstructivism and that should therefore 
characterize a democracy’s approach to criminal justice: the “moral culture 
principle of criminalization,” the “principle of prosocial punishment,” and 
the “We the People principle of criminal procedure.” As the American 
criminal system routinely violates all three principles, this Essay closes by 
suggesting that the present crisis of American criminal justice stems in 
substantial part from criminal law and procedure’s bureaucratic and 
instrumental, rather than democratic and reconstructive, path of 
development. The three principles point to a better alternative and suggest a 
direction for criminal justice reform. 
AUTHOR—Associate Professor of Law and (by courtesy) Philosophy, 
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INTRODUCTION 
The object of this Essay is to link a theory of criminal law and 
procedure I’ve developed in prior work, “reconstructivism,”1 to the theory 
and practice of democracy. On the theoretical side, the claim is this: a 
decent community’s ethical life—by which I mean the moral culture 
disclosed by a community’s public deliberations or implicit in its social 
practices and institutions, provided those deliberations, practices, and 
institutions reflect or were formed in reasonably non-oppressive 
conditions—should command a measure of political authority in 
democratic societies because part of what collective self-determination 
means is that a political community can see its norms reflected in its laws. 
Ethical life should likewise command authority on a reconstructive 
approach to criminal law and procedure because reconstructivism holds 
that criminal justice’s distinctive social function is to protect and repair the 
social norms on which community solidarity depends in the wake of acts 
that attack those norms. Reconstructivism as a theory of criminal justice 
and democracy as a theory of government are thus linked by what they 
mutually treasure—by the fact that both valorize a decent community’s 
ability to build a distinctive form of life infused with values that are the 
community’s own. 
On the practical side, this Essay specifies three principles that follow 
from the democracy/reconstructivism union and should therefore 
characterize a democratic society’s approach to criminal justice. Briefly 
stated, the “moral culture principle of criminalization” holds that, barring 
special conditions, only those acts that violate and attack the values on 
which social life is based, and can therefore truly be characterized as 
“antisocial,” should be legally designated crimes. The “principle of 
1 Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1485 (2016). 
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prosocial punishment” holds that punishment’s first purpose and 
justification is to provide a prosocial response to an antisocial act, 
restitching the social fabric that crime tears (assuming “crime” is defined 
according to the moral culture principle). Finally, the “We the People 
principle of criminal procedure” holds that the administration and 
enforcement of criminal law should be so structured that lay citizens take 
part in it and see their sense of justice at work in it, rather than left wholly 
to officials and experts acting on the instrumental reasons characteristic of 
bureaucratic control. 
What is most striking about these three principles in light of American 
criminal justice today is how routinely they are violated: we criminalize for 
instrumental reasons unconnected to or inconsistent with our culture, we 
punish in ways that are nearly as antisocial as crime itself, and we 
administer and enforce criminal law through procedures that crowd lay 
voices out of the system and undermine social solidarity rather than 
building it. We have, in short, drifted away from what might be termed 
democratic–reconstructive forms of order in criminal justice and toward 
bureaucratic–instrumental ones, and this Essay’s final suggestion is that 
much of our present dysfunction traces back to this drift. So the three 
principles have something to teach us about the way out of the crisis. They 
do not by any means address all of the complex questions of law, practice, 
and policy the crisis presents, but I submit that these three principles 
illuminate the appropriate direction of change. They show us where the gap 
is between criminal law as it is and criminal law as it should be. 
As this is an exceedingly short essay for goals so ambitious, a caveat 
is in order. The arguments here are designed to show how a set of ideas 
developed in prior work and planned future work hang together, not to 
explain and defend those ideas in full. Each of the pieces—
reconstructivism, democracy, the three principles, the diagnosis of the 
present, the prescription for the future—is complicated and subject to 
reasonable objections that merit careful responses, which this Essay is not 
meant to provide. The only thing I hope to explain here is how the pieces 
fit into a whole. 
I. RECONSTRUCTIVISM
Reconstructivism holds that criminal law and procedure have a 
distinctive role to play in the social world: where a wrong has been 
committed that is of such a nature as to attack the values on which social 
life is based, it is the office of criminal law to reconstruct that violated 
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normative order (hence “normative reconstruction” or “reconstructivism”).2 
To use the clichéd but helpful metaphor, where crime tears the social 
fabric, criminal law’s distinctive function is to restitch it. If criminal law 
does not do so and no adequate substitute for criminal law is found, the 
authority of the violated norm and the dignity of any violated victims will 
be diminished. The unanswered wrong will exact a cost in the currency of 
social solidarity: members of the society will over time come to feel less 
bound to one another, to the norm violated by the crime, and by extension 
to the normative order of the state and the law as a whole. Gradually, the 
society’s substructure of shared values will be altered or broken, and a 
society thus damaged will be less able to secure the flourishing of the 
community and the individuals who make it up than one with an intact, 
shared set of values. 
Reconstructivism is thus a type of communitarian consequentialism,3 
but it is a minimal type of communitarianism because it is localized to 
criminal law, because the norms at work in criminal law tend to be (or 
should be) fairly basic and widely acknowledged, and because wrongs that 
attack the foundations of social life are uncommon and therefore leave 
plenty of room for norm contestation. So a reconstructivist need not be a 
communitarian about all things: one could, for example, be a 
reconstructivist about criminal law and favor the individualistic, creative 
destruction of free markets, because a reconstructivist could without 
inconsistency hold that the market should not have a communitarian 
character. Not every component of a complex society has the same internal 
norms or organizing ends. Nor need a reconstructivist disagree with 
political liberalism’s claim that societies are and should be comprised of 
diverse individuals and subcommunities with different sets of values, 
whose goal in the political sphere is to find fair terms of cooperation rather 
than complete normative agreement.4 Emphatically, a reconstructivist can 
acknowledge and even celebrate norm contestation, particularly if one 
follows the thread of reconstructivism to deliberative democracy, as I 
2 This discussion surveys the ground more fully covered in Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 
1. 
3 In a previous article, I stated: “[W]hile I don’t have strong objections to characterizing 
reconstructivism as consequentialist, I think the characterization obscures more than it illuminates.” 
Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 1, at 1532. I now think that was an error: the “consequentialist” 
label is helpful. 
4 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xviii, xxv (1993) (“[T]he problem of political 
liberalism is: How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal 
citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines? . . . What are the fair terms of social cooperation between citizens characterized as free and 
equal yet divided by profound doctrinal conflict?”). 
111:1455 (2017) Three Principles 
1459 
suggest below.5 Reconstructivism’s premise is only this: every society—
including diverse, democratic ones (perhaps especially diverse, democratic 
ones)—needs some minimum of normative alignment around a shared set 
of values if it is to safeguard and advance the flourishing of the community 
and the individuals who make it up, because a society without that 
minimum will be unable to secure the benefits of social cooperation, 
mitigate the risks of social conflict, sustain itself over time, and maintain a 
functioning public sphere (including a sphere of values contestation).6 That 
premise granted, reconstructivism only points out criminal law and 
procedure’s distinctive place in maintaining this minimum of normative 
alignment. 
Why “distinctive”? Many social practices and institutions contribute 
to maintaining normative alignment, most obviously educational ones; 
what makes criminal justice so important? The answer has to do with the 
special character of crime—that is, with the special problem presented by 
serious wrongdoing. The problem of wrongdoing is different from the 
problem of evil, which, in secular terms, is the problem of how we can 
rationally maintain belief in or hope for the goodness of the world in light 
5 See infra Part II. In fact, the idea that communitarians of any sort must insist on an unchanging 
consensus of values misunderstands what is best in communitarianism. Robert Bellah expresses my 
view exactly: 
Those who think of community as a form of Gemeinschaft, as well as their liberal critics, tend to 
think consensus about values and goals must be complete or nearly complete. Is such complete 
consensus realistic, or even desirable, in modern societies? 
 The answer, of course, is no. Yet this lack of unanimity need not create problems for 
supporters of community. While community-shared values and goals do imply something more 
than procedural agreement—they do imply some agreements about substance—they do not 
require anything like total or unarguable agreement. A good community is one in which there is 
argument, even conflict, about the meaning of the shared values and goals, and certainly about 
how they will be actualized in everyday life. Community is not about silent consensus; it is a 
form of intelligent, reflective life, in which there is indeed consensus, but where the consensus 
can be challenged and changed—often gradually, sometimes radically—over time. 
Robert N. Bellah, Community Properly Understood: A Defense of “Democratic Communitarianism,” 
6 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, no. 1, Winter 1995–96, at 49, 50. 
6 Even Rawls recognized the need for a minimum of such agreement—agreement about toleration, 
for example—if society is to function, and part of what makes Rawls so interesting is his clear-eyed 
recognition of the need for a form of justice that functions. His goal was to discern the premises of “a 
reasonably harmonious and stable pluralist society,” a society that is “over time . . . stable and just,” 
and his historical view was that “the success of liberal constitutionalism came as a discovery of a new 
social possibility . . . . Before the successful and peaceful practice of toleration in societies with liberal 
institutions there was no way of knowing of that possibility.” See RAWLS, supra note 4, at xxv 
(emphasis added). He thought that, in a liberal society, free and equal citizens divided by opposing 
“comprehensive doctrines” nonetheless “all affirm the political conception of a constitutional regime” 
and his goal was to discover how that might be so. Id. at xviii. But they “all affirm” something—
something quite considerable, in fact. A Rawlsian could be a reconstructivist. 
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of the suffering in the world. The problem of wrongdoing is this: whatever 
society we build, however good and just, it is the human condition that 
some people some of the time will commit wrongs so serious as to attack, 
deny, and threaten the values on which society is based and on which the 
welfare of the individuals comprising society depends—wrongs both 
unbearable to endure and dangerous to ignore—and thus to live in a world 
of serious wrongdoing inevitably compels us to face the question of how to 
respond. Criminal justice is an institution of response; broadly conceived, 
criminal justice is simply the set of practices and institutions by which 
societies respond to serious wrongdoing. In a sense, serious wrongdoing 
calls criminal justice into being. It is reconstructivism’s insight that if such 
wrongdoing is not answered in a way that the community finds intelligible 
and adequate, the values and people targeted by such wrongdoing will be 
undermined. Thus the reason criminal justice plays a distinctive and 
important role in maintaining normative alignment is because criminal 
justice in some form is necessary to society’s self-maintenance in the wake 
of serious wrongdoing. The point of criminal law and procedure is not 
chiefly to dole out retributive justice, nor to optimize material costs and 
benefits, nor to minimize coercive harm, the way a Kantian retributivist, 
Benthamite utilitarian, or Millian liberal might propose.7 Reconstructivism 
breaks with all three of these theories—the dominant theories of criminal 
justice in America today.8 The fundamental purpose of criminal justice is to 
protect a society’s moral culture. If a theory can be measured by what it 
treasures, it is reconstructivism’s distinctive feature that it treasures a 
community’s lived moral culture—what Hegel termed Sittlichkeit 
(“embodied ethical life”)9—above individual just deserts, efficient crime 
control, or liberal mildness. 
7 For the backdrop to this contrast, see Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 1, at 1491–92, 
1524–32. 
8 In Germany, by contrast, a strand of criminal theory has risen to prominence—the “affirmative 
general prevention” theory—that does focus on the need to affirm and defend norms following a crime. 
See Thomas Weigend, Sentencing and Punishment in Germany, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN 
WESTERN COUNTRIES 188, 209 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001). Affirmative general 
prevention is a member of the reconstructive family, though just one member of the family. 
9 See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 404 § 34 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. 
Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) (commentary by Allen W. Wood) (“‘Morality’ 
refers to the subjective life of the individual agent, in so far as it abstracts itself from its social and 
historical situation . . . . ‘Ethics’ or ‘ethical life’ (Sittlichkeit) means something like ‘customary 
morality.’ Hegel uses it to refer simultaneously to a system of social institutions and to the moral 
attitude of the individual who identifies with and lives them.” (internal citations omitted)); see also 
ROBERT B. PIPPIN, HEGEL’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY: RATIONAL AGENCY AS ETHICAL LIFE 6 (2008) 
(“[A]ny given social world is also a nexus of common significances, saliences, taboos, and a general 
shared orientation that can also either be sustained or can fail. Indeed one of the most interesting aspects 
of such a social condition, shared meaningfulness, or intelligibility, is that it can fail, go dead, lose its 
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To sharpen this contrast—and to see some of reconstructivism’s 
power relative to its competitors—consider how these four theoretical 
perspectives would understand the beating of Rodney King by police 
officers in 1991 and the riots that followed the officers’ acquittal. If we 
stipulate that the beating was a wrong that deserved punishment, a typical 
retributivist would see the acquittal in terms of individual injustice and the 
rioters’ violence as separate wrongs also deserving punishment, depending 
on the appropriate moral evaluation of each case. A typical utilitarian 
would see the beating and the riots in terms of crime control, injuries, and 
property damage, and would favor a set of responses designed to minimize 
crime and cost. A typical Millian would see the beating and riots as 
setbacks to liberty—the first a wrongful abuse of state power toward an 
individual, the second a wrongful failure of the state to protect individuals 
from one another—and would justify punishment in terms of minimizing 
coercive harm overall (perhaps coupled with a general taste for 
Enlightenment mildness). The problem with these responses is not so much 
that they are wrong or false as that they miss what matters most about the 
Rodney King situation. The retributive and liberal viewpoints are so 
individualistic that they cannot see the sociological character of the events, 
and the utilitarian viewpoint is so materialistic (in the sense of focusing on 
material, tangible things, like the body, property, and financial cost) that it 
cannot see the degree to which the events were about America’s culture.  
A reconstructivist, by contrast, sees the Rodney King beating as 
encoding a social message that Americans with ordinary cultural fluency 
could not fail to understand: that the right to be free from violence is not 
secure in encounters with the police, at least if the suspect is black, which if 
true means that black Americans have lesser rights than other Americans. 
The wrong of the beating thus transmits a dual message, in part about 
claims of abstract principle (the right to physical integrity), and in part 
about the dignity of the victim and others like the victim (the social 
position of black Americans). One cannot understand the wrong in purely 
material or purely individual terms; to understand it is to understand its 
social meaning. 
Yet that is just the first half of the story, for the key to understanding 
the Rodney King case from a reconstructive standpoint is to see that the 
riots took place, not after the crime, but only after the acquittal. The 
beating was caught on video and the video drew immense national 
attention, but no riots took place then. People are prepared to accept that 
grip, and a very great deal of what interests Hegel is simply what such shared practical meaningfulness 
must be that it could fail . . . . His general name for the achievement and maintenance of such a form of 
intelligible life is ‘Sittlichkeit’ . . . .”). 
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serious wrongs have taken place in their society, if only because they take 
place in every society. It was the verdict, not the crime, that spoke with the 
community’s voice, and thus it was the verdict, not the crime, that had the 
power to affirm or deny the crime’s message about violence, rights, and 
race for purposes of defining America’s moral culture. Reconstructivism 
sees crime and punishment as an exchange of meanings, a conversation 
about the values that will prevail in a community. The issue for a 
reconstructivist is always what a crime and its punishment in a given 
cultural context mean. In the Rodney King case, the officers’ actions were 
in effect an unanswered question to the country: “We regard ourselves as 
privileged to use any level of violence we see fit, at least in encounters with 
black men. Don’t you?” The community answered through trial and 
punishment, and it was the answer, not the question, that cut the threads 
that made the rioters feel joined to the community and its laws. Thus the 
central tragedy of the affair from a reconstructive standpoint was not the 
material loss associated with the beating and riots, nor the various setbacks 
to liberty, nor even the miscarriages of justice, but the damage done to 
three sets of norms and a body of socially necessary emotions: norms of 
equal citizenship; norms of restraint in the use of state violence; norms of 
restraint in the use of private violence; and the sense of solidarity between 
black Americans and the rest of America, particularly between black 
Americans and the police, the state, and the law. 
Now, the Rodney King case is exceptional, to be sure, but what makes 
it exceptional is mostly a matter of scale. The tens of thousands of typical 
crimes and punishments that are the bread and butter of criminal law work 
the same way. Thefts break down norms of property, and punishment 
rebuilds them. Burglaries deny the security of the home, and punishment 
affirms it. Domestic violence degrades its victims, and punishment denies 
their degradation. The measure of success in criminal justice is social 
solidarity around a shared moral culture; the measure of failure is alienation 
and normative disintegration. 
Reconstructivism is the work of many hands over time, but it is also 
widely misunderstood—even a lost tradition in criminal theory. The people 
comprising the reconstructive tradition have not been systematically aware 
of one another and of their common point of view, and thus have never 
gotten to the bottom of the view; indeed they have often misunderstood it.10 
The founding figures are Hegel and Durkheim—the one a sociological 
philosopher, the other a philosophical sociologist, as befits a theory 
perched at the intersection of those two fields—but many criminal justice 
10 See Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 1, at 1486–89, 1524–34. 
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scholars and practitioners who would substantially agree with what Hegel 
and Durkheim wrote do not think of themselves as Hegelian or 
Durkheimian. Reconstructivism would be in a stronger position if its 
adherents were more self-aware and, to that end, I would like here to 
venture a suggestion: that many criminal justice democratizers are latent 
reconstructivists. That is not a necessary connection: one could be a 
democratizer as a matter of criminal justice policy without being a 
reconstructivist as a matter of criminal justice theory. (A libertarian 
suspicious of official power might hold that view, for example.) But it is 
contingently the case that many of those who favor criminal justice reform 
in a democratic direction also look at criminal law in reconstructivist ways, 
whether self-consciously or not. 
Consider the participants in the present Symposium on democratic 
criminal justice. The empirical, social scientific work of Tracey Meares,11 
Paul Robinson,12 and Tom Tyler13—research on procedural justice, 
intuitions about punishment, and legal compliance—focuses on exactly the 
relationship between community values and criminal justice on which 
reconstructivism is fixated. Their prediction that where those two diverge, 
noncompliance will follow, is a contemporary social scientist’s version of 
Durkheim’s claims for social solidarity.14 In addition, Meares’s argument 
that police actions send social messages that can either undermine or 
support a sense of common, equal citizenship fits exactly into 
reconstructivism’s understanding of crime and punishment as 
communication oriented to solidarity. Antony Duff’s and John 
Braithwaite’s criminal law communitarianism—Duff’s philosophical 
arguments that criminalization, trial, and punishment should express 
11 See, in this Issue, Tracey Meares, Policing Procedural Justice: Shaping Citizens’ Identities to 
Increase Democratic Participation, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1525 (2017). 
12 See, in this Issue, Paul H. Robinson, Democratizing Criminal Law: Feasibility, Utility, and the 
Challenge of Social Change, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1565 (2017). 
13 See, in this Issue, Tom R. Tyler, From Harm Reduction to Community Engagement: Redefining 
the Goals of American Policing in the Twenty-First Century, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1537 (2017).  
14 Durkheim’s view was that social solidarity based on shared norms produces compliance, and that 
fostering such solidarity is the chief purpose of criminal justice: “Thus, the essential function of 
punishment is not to make the guilty expiate his crime through suffering or to intimidate possible 
imitators through threats, but to buttress those consciences which violations of a rule can and must 
necessarily disturb in their faith—even though they themselves aren't aware of it; to show them that this 
faith continues to be justified . . . .” EMILE DURKHEIM, MORAL EDUCATION 167 (Everett K. Wilson ed., 
Everett K. Wilson & Herman Schnurer trans., Free Press 1961) (1925). Or to use the model of 
classroom discipline, which Durkheim used at the end of his life as a sort of allegory for criminal 
justice: “With the child as with the adult, moral authority is a creature of opinion and draws all its force 
from opinion. Consequently, what lends authority to the rule in school is the feeling that the children 
have for it . . . and everything that might attenuate this feeling, everything that might induce children to 
believe that it is not really inviolable can scarcely fail to strike discipline at its very source.” Id. at 165. 
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society’s moral condemnation,15 and Braithwaite’s philosophical arguments 
that restorative justice should repair fractured relationships16—are 
variations on the Hegelian theme of embodied ethical life. The doctrinal 
and institutional investigations of Laura Appleman,17 Stephanos Bibas,18 
Richard Bierschbach,19 Josh Bowers,20 and Jocelyn Simonson21 all center on 
the idea that contemporary criminal law has, to its detriment, sidelined 
community voices and values in favor of instrumentally rational 
bureaucratic agencies, and that criminal law can only play its proper part in 
the social world if it is governed in more community-oriented ways. These 
are ideas for which reconstructivism provides theoretical foundations. They 
are also ideas that characterize the work of Bill Stuntz, who was, I submit, 
both a reconstructivist and a democratizer, though he died before the labels 
came into use.22 He is an intellectual father to many of us in the 
democratization movement and surely would have joined our efforts had he 
only lived a little longer. Finally, one important feature of Dorothy 
Roberts’s,23 Jonathan Simon’s,24 Jocelyn Simonson’s,25 and, again Tracey 
15 See, in this Issue, R A Duff, A Criminal Law We Can Call Our Own?, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1491 
(2017). 
16 See, in this Issue, John Braithwaite, Criminal Justice that Revives Republican Democracy, 
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1507 (2017). 
17 See, in this Issue, Laura I Appleman, Local Democracy, Community Adjudication, and Criminal 
Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1413 (2017). 
18 See, in this Issue, Stephanos Bibas, Restoring Democratic Moral Judgment Within Bureaucratic 
Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1677 (2017). 
19 See, in this Issue, Richard A. Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the Constitutional 
Law of Punishment, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1437 (2017). 
20 See, in this Issue, Josh Bowers, Upside-Down Juries, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1655 (2017). 
21 See, in this Issue, Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and 
Resistance, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609 (2017). 
22 Consider, for example, Stuntz’s arguments that the cause of American criminal justice’s severity 
is not chiefly voters’ harshness but prosecutors’ incentives; that common law mens rea standards, 
because of their moralistic and open-ended character, open up a necessary space for nontechnical 
argumentation about culpability and equity in criminal justice trials; that criminal justice should 
generally be in the hands of local neighborhoods; that, in particular, prosecutors should be elected from 
highly local community units like neighborhoods rather than from large counties; that it is juries’ role to 
use the power of nullification to exercise mercy and keep state officials in line; that criminal law’s 
expressive qualities are key to its proper functioning; that one of the problems with excessive 
criminalization is the diminishment of that expressive function; and that alienation is key to the 
crime/race problem. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ & JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, DEFINING CRIMES 104, 181–82, 190–
201 (2011); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 283–87, 305–07 (2011); 
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 520–23 (2001). 
23 See, in this Issue, Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1597 (2017). 
24 See, in this Issue, Jonathan Simon, Racing Abnormality, Normalizing Race: The Origins of 
America’s Peculiar Carceral State and Its Prospects for Democratic Transformation Today, 111 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1625 (2017).
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Meares’s26 arguments about racial justice is the recognition of criminal 
law’s capacity to transmit social messages that risk fracturing communities 
along racial lines—a capacity and a risk that reconstructivism highlights. 
Now, this Symposium is about democratization, not reconstructivism; the 
people gathered for it were chosen for their democratic policy 
commitments, not their latent theoretical views. But many democratizers in 
criminal justice are in fact latent reconstructivists. The link between 
democratic and reconstructive ideas is so strong that when people take hold 
of one it tends to pull them toward the other. 
II. RECONSTRUCTIVISM AND DEMOCRACY
Why is that link so strong? What exactly is the connection between 
reconstructive and democratic ideas? To see the answer, we need to 
consider strands of democratic theory that treasure ethical life as 
reconstructivism does—that see democracy in terms of a community’s 
capacity to form its culture in conditions of deliberative freedom and to 
project the culture thus formed into political life. For purposes of fixing 
concepts, it is useful to contrast three types of democratic theory: those that 
see democracy exclusively in terms of governmental processes (e.g., voting 
in elections, representative institutions, parliamentary supremacy, checks 
and balances);27 those that see democracy in terms of advancing liberal 
values (e.g., equality, liberty, individual rights);28 and those that see 
democracy in terms of collective self-determination, popular sovereignty, 
and self-government, and therefore focus on whether the views of the 
people who make up the political community are reflected in their law 
(e.g., majoritarianism, communitarianism, certain types of republicanism).29 
One need not see these three as competitors; they might be complements, 
25 See, in this Issue, Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and 
Resistance, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609 (2017). 
26 See, in this Issue, Meares, supra note 11. 
27 See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 241 (Routledge 
2010) (1942) (“[T]he democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote.”). 
28 See, e.g., PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT ix, 7–8
(1997) (defining republican democracy as a system of government based on “freedom as non-
domination,” and, in a move that is unusual only for its candor, openly disavowing any close 
association between democracy and majority rule). 
29 See, e.g., Robert Post, Democracy and Equality, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 24, 
25–26 (2006) (rejecting a conception of democracy in terms of liberal values and insisting that, even if 
democracy is not identical to majoritarian voting procedures, democracy must nonetheless consist in 
some form of collective self-determination). 
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highlighting different facets of democracy (surely a multifaceted thing).30 
And the list is not exhaustive. I draw the contrast only because it is helpful 
for understanding the sense in which reconstructivism is democratic. 
Reconstructivism’s democratic character is not a matter of purely 
governmental processes or liberal values (the first and second type of 
theory or facet of democracy), but of the way in which reconstructivism 
prizes the views and values of the people who make up the political 
community—that is, the way in which reconstructivism relates to the ideal 
of popular sovereignty and self-government embedded in the ideal, “We 
the People.” 
The central thought is this: in a democratic society, law and other 
exercises of governmental power should reflect and respond to the ethical 
life of the people living under that law and government. By “ethical life,” I 
mean the values disclosed by a community’s public deliberations or 
implicit in its social practices and institutions, provided those deliberations, 
practices, and institutions reflect or were formed in reasonably non-
oppressive conditions. The proviso is not ad hoc. For a community’s ethical 
life to have democratic authority, that ethical life must be consistent with 
the premise that the people who comprise society should command its law. 
That premise necessarily excludes forms of ethical life based on one 
portion of society oppressing, manipulating, denying equal citizenship to, 
or otherwise dominating another portion of society. Democratic ethical life 
is thus necessarily limited to moral cultures formed in reasonably free and 
equal conditions. Whether this condition is enough to exclude from 
consideration all communities with unjust cultures is an open question, but 
it excludes a great many of them, and I think it authorizes us to focus the 
inquiry here on the ethical lives of communities that, if not perfectly just, 
are at least reasonably decent. My claim, then, is that a decent community’s 
ethical life should command a measure of political authority in democratic 
societies because part of what collective self-determination means is that a 
30 My own view is that democracy is multifaceted and all three of these types of democratic theory, 
which do not contradict one another, are true in part. That is, I think majoritarian electoral processes of 
the kind Schumpeter describes, supra note 27, are an indispensable minimum in any large democratic 
country, both as a matter of definition (using the term “democracy” in a way that makes sense of 
ordinary language) and as a matter of securing one of democracy’s great benefits: protecting the 
citizenry’s capacity to protect itself against abusive leadership. I also think democracy implies a set of 
substantive liberal values: for example, to give each person one vote, and no more, is to affirm the 
equality and dignity of the members of the political community. (A majority vote to remove voting 
rights from a minority of the population would be undemocratic even if electorally approved.) And I 
also think that majoritarian electoral processes and liberal rights are, although necessary, insufficient for 
democratic government, because a society is not fully democratic if the members of the political 
community cannot participate in fashioning the law under which they live—law that reflects their 
values and views. 
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political community can see its norms reflected in its laws. I do not claim 
that this is the sum of democracy, but it is a facet of democracy, and what I 
would like to do in the paragraphs that follow is explain why this facet of 
democracy matters and connect it to democratic theory. 
The problem that motivates this discussion is the problem presented 
when political power in a society is exercised in ways that are grossly 
inconsistent with the way in which that society’s people lead their lives and 
consider it right to lead their lives—that is, the democratic problem 
presented when law and culture become disconnected. The situation arises 
most vividly in the context of colonial rule, where the law is potentially 
alienating because it is literally alien to the culture it governs: British law in 
colonized India sometimes had this character. The law emanated from a 
different culture and even when it was a step forward in terms of liberal 
values, it was a step back in terms of self-determination, because there was 
no sense in which the Indian people could rationally see the law as their 
own. The situation can also arise when a splinter group within a society 
gets control of the government, as in contemporary Iran. But we need not 
look so far afield: one of the odd problems of contemporary American 
criminal law is how often we criminalize in ways inconsistent with normal 
social practice. In California, for example, the age of sexual consent is 
eighteen and, while there is a reduction in charge where the perpetrator and 
victim are close in age, it is nonetheless criminal for two unmarried 
teenagers under the age of eighteen to have sex; each party counts as both 
victim and perpetrator.31 Yet the average American, and presumably the 
average Californian, loses his or her virginity at age seventeen.32 Outside 
my office in Chicago, there is an eight-lane divided highway that is one of 
the city’s major north–south arteries. Naturally, people drive fifty to 
seventy miles per hour on that highway, but the posted speed limit along its 
entire length is forty miles per hour, which means that virtually every 
driver on the road is committing a moving violation, and anyone driving 
over sixty-five miles per hour is guilty of a misdemeanor.33 Federal 
criminal law in the United States makes sharing videos or music under 
broadly defined circumstances a felony carrying a multi-year prison term,34 
but 70% of Americans aged 18–29 and 46% of all Americans have illegally 
copied or downloaded videos or music, and only 12% of all Americans 
31 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 2014). 
32 Key Statistics From the National Survey of Family Growth, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nsfg/key_statistics/s.htm#sexualactivity [https://perma.cc/
K8LW-3W6J]. 
33 See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-601.5 (2016). 
34 See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2012). 
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think such copying or downloading should be punishable with 
imprisonment.35 The examples could be multiplied. Why American 
government, despite a system of elected representatives, establishes such 
laws is an interesting question to ponder: surely the influence of powerful 
lobbies is one reason (particularly in the copyright case), and police and 
prosecutors’ enforcement discretion is another (enforcement discretion, as 
Stuntz has argued, gives officials at multiple levels of government 
incentives to broaden criminal law).36 But my goal here is not to unpack the 
political structures that bring these laws about. My goal here is to vindicate 
the intuition that, although these laws were established by elected 
representatives, they are nonetheless undemocratic in the normative sense 
that the law is inconsistent with the ethical life of the people living under 
it.37 
The first step is to notice some of the tributary streams of thought that 
make up the third type of democratic theory touched on above—that is, the 
understanding of democracy in terms of collective self-determination, 
popular sovereignty, and self-government. My Manifesto of Democratic 
Criminal Justice earlier in this Symposium focuses exactly on these 
streams of thought.38 From Max Weber, the Manifesto builds a conception 
of democracy as anti-bureaucratic, that is, resistant to rule by a 
professional corps of officials and experts exercising the rule-based and 
instrumental modes of reasoning characteristic of bureaucratic governance. 
In democracies, the lay citizenry, exercising its characteristically equitable 
and value rational modes of reasoning, directs the bureaucracy. From 
Jürgen Habermas, the Manifesto builds a conception of democracy as 
deliberative, that is, a structure of government in which citizens deliberate 
in conditions of freedom on matters of public concern, form (however 
imperfectly) a democratic opinion or general will on those matters, and 
have the capacity to make government heed that democratic opinion or 
general will. From Alexis de Tocqueville, the Manifesto builds a 
conception of democracy as participatory, that is, a structure of 
government in which citizens sometimes take the reins of government 
35 JOE KARAGANIS & LENNART RENKEMA, AM. ASSEMBLY COLUMBIA UNIV., COPY CULTURE IN 
THE US & GERMANY 30–31, 40–41 (2013), http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/01/Copy-Culture.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6TM-6KR7]. 
36 Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 22, at 528. 
37 In Reconstructivism, after touching on this theme, I stated that “[w]orking out the metes and 
bounds of reconstructivism’s democratic claims would be a large project,” better saved for a separate 
article. Kleinfeld, Reconstrucivism, supra note 1, at 1555. This is that separate article. The political 
theory in this Part is one aspect of working out reconstructivism’s democratic metes and bounds; the 
three principles in the next Part are another. 
38 Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367 (2017). 
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themselves, engaging in direct self-government (as with jury service) or 
forms of popular majoritarianism that are just one remove from direct self-
government. What these three bodies of thought have in common is, first, 
an insistence that democracy means something more than merely electing 
rulers (even “representative” rulers) and, second, a refusal to substitute a 
substantive conception of justice or substantive set of liberal values for the 
democratic project of self-rule. Rather, anti-bureaucratic, deliberative, and 
participatory theory all take seriously the ideal of a sovereign people 
governing itself—of government “by” and “of” the people. All three types 
of theory center on the view that, for a society to be fully democratic, the 
exercise of political power within that society must be closely linked to 
“We the People.” 
This is clearly the appropriate context for the idea I’m advancing 
here—the idea that, in a democratic society, the exercise of political power 
must reflect the citizenry’s ethical life. But the Manifesto’s development of 
the concept of democracy was designed to fit everyone in the movement to 
democratize criminal justice, not just reconstructivists, and the popular 
sovereignty-oriented vein of democratic theory that the Manifesto mines, 
while certainly applicable to a theory of democracy in terms of ethical life, 
is not directly about ethical life. Reconstructivism’s democratic demands 
are more specific than those suggested by anti-bureaucratic, participatory, 
and conventional forms of deliberative democratic theory. 
Reconstructivism is specifically about the link between culture and 
government. Our quarry is a form of democratic theory that highlights the 
place of culture in understanding what democracy is and why democracy 
matters. Such a theory would be a subcategory of the popular sovereignty 
vein of democratic thought, alongside or within anti-bureaucratic, 
deliberative, or participatory veins of democratic thought. What I’d like to 
suggest here is that the raw materials from which to fashion this sort of 
culturally oriented form of democratic theory are already available in the 
deliberative tradition, and a handful of democratic theorists with 
communitarian leanings have begun to mine those raw materials. 
Deliberative theory has a certain standard structure. As I write in the 
Manifesto, “[d]eliberative democracy focuses on the importance, in any 
political community that aspires to be truly democratic, of free and equal 
citizens within the community deliberating on matters of shared political 
concern.”39 Deliberative theory thus envisions a sphere of communication 
prior to majoritarian decisionmaking—Habermas speaks of it in terms of 
39 Id. at 1385. 
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the “lifeworld” and “public sphere”40—within which, through deliberation, 
citizens form a democratic will. They then impress their will upon the law, 
and, because the law is made from their views, thereby rule themselves. 
The orienting ideal is one of authorship: “where the community makes the 
law out of its own convictions, the community can truly be seen as self-
governing; the people can rationally see themselves as the law’s author.”41 
This sounds very close to the idea of fashioning law on the basis of culture 
or ethical life. But not all is as it seems. Mainstream deliberative 
democracy, particularly in the Habermasian tradition, has a strongly 
rationalizing orientation. Theorists in this vein insist that the exercise of 
political power must be based, not on actual deliberation followed by a fair 
vote, but on a hypothetical consensus that would presumptively follow 
from a fully rational deliberative process.42 The game then becomes one of 
specifying the relevant idealizing conditions.43 Developed in this way, 
deliberative democratic theory becomes almost the antithesis of a 
conception of democracy in terms of culture or ethical life—or, indeed, of 
any popular sovereignty-oriented conception of democracy. It becomes a 
tool by which to condemn real deliberation and real cultures for not being 
rational enough (not living up to the idealizing conditions), and thus, 
ironically, to delegitimize real majorities for not being democratic enough. 
Democracy becomes the rule of what the theorist imagines to be the best 
reasons rather than the rule of the people. 
I think this shift in deliberative democratic theory from actual self-
government to a hypothetical consensus based on perfect rationality is a 
mistake of the first order.44 But it need not detain us. The underlying ideas 
40 Id. at 1388–89, 1389 n.73. 
41 Id. at 1385. 
42 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 107, 110 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992) (holding 
that “[j]ust those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as 
participants in rational discourses” and that “only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet 
with the assent . . . of all citizens”). 
43 See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 7 (1996) 
(presenting, over the course of three chapters, “the kinds of reasons that should be given, the forum in 
which they should be given, and the agents to whom and by whom they should be given” in properly 
constituted deliberative conditions). 
44 Nicholas Wolterstorff expresses my view exactly: 
Rationality does not typically yield consensus. Rationality coupled with information typically 
leaves us disagreeing with each other. . . . [But] [t]here is, after all, a perfectly familiar, and to 
my mind admirable, procedure in liberal democracies for reaching a decision on some political 
issue when we find ourselves still disagreeing after we have debated—as we almost always do. 
We take a vote. In Rorty, Rawls, Audi, Larmore, and their cohorts, there is an implicit dislike 
for a procedure that I regard as belonging to the very essence of a democracy, namely, 
voting. . . . It’s my view that it is the genius of liberal democracy to guarantee certain basic 
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of deliberative democracy—the idea of a communicatively constituted 
lifeworld and public sphere, the idea of deliberation giving rise to 
democratic opinion that in turn determines government, and above all the 
authorial ideal of law that is a community’s own because it reflects the 
community’s own views and values—are not married to the rationalist 
program. In fact, they are precisely the equipment we need to understand 
why democratic law must reflect a community’s ethical life.  
Two moves are key. The first is to see that democratic opinion- and 
will-formation do not and cannot proceed from some separate sphere of 
political discourse hived off from the rest of culture. The communicatively 
constituted lifeworld and public sphere in which democratic opinion- and 
will-formation take place essentially are a community’s culture. The 
opinions and will that emerge from that culture partake of rationalistic 
forms of argument but come from many other sources as well, and are 
better—sounder, more protected from rationalism’s excesses, more 
sensitive to and honest about human realities, more habitable—because of 
the complexity of that mixture. Indeed, the lifeworld and public sphere 
properly understood consist not only in discourse but also in value-bearing 
social practices and institutions. Much of a society’s evolved wisdom 
manifests, not in rationalistic forms of argument, but in these value-bearing 
social practices and institutions. Baseball, jazz music, and premarital sex 
are all part of the lifeworld and public sphere from which democracy is 
made. Furthermore, the lifeworld and public sphere cannot be limited to 
expressly political matters because “politics” can potentially be anything 
and because the inputs into politics can potentially come from anywhere. 
The use of steroids in baseball can become a political issue, and when it 
does, the set of cultural experiences, images, and values associated with 
competitive sports become part of democratic opinion- and will-formation. 
In other words, political issues in democratic societies are not just a matter 
of narrowly rationalistic political argumentation but of who we are and 
want to be as a society—a matter of our ethical life.45  
rights and liberties to its citizens and resident aliens, and to assure access by all normal adults to 
fair voting procedures. 
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, UNDERSTANDING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 25, 49–50 (Terence Cuneo ed., 
2012). I also discuss this issue in the Manifesto. Kleinfeld, Manifesto, supra note 38, at 1386 & nn.63–
64. 
45 Habermas recognizes and criticizes the view I am defending. Some “contemporary republicans,” 
he writes, give “public communication a communitarian reading” and thus look at politics in terms of 
explicating “a shared form of life or collective identity” and treat political questions as “ethical 
questions where we, as members of a community, ask ourselves who we are and who we would like to 
be.” Jürgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1, 4 (1994). He 
objects because he thinks these ethical questions are “subordinate to moral questions . . . in the narrow 
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The second key move is to see that the authorial ideal (the ideal of a 
political community that can rationally see itself as the author of its own 
law) extends simply by the terms of its own logic to the idea that a 
community’s ethical life must be reflected in its law. The authorial ideal 
captures perfectly what goes wrong when law becomes radically 
disconnected from culture, as in colonized India under British rule, 
contemporary Iran under theocratic rule, or in the bizarre array of 
American laws that make ordinary patterns of American life criminal. Such 
law is undemocratic because it is not rationally possible for the people 
living under it to see themselves as the author of law that violates the 
people’s own way of life. 
We thus come to a modified version of deliberative democracy in 
which the central idea is that democracy requires giving each person a fair 
opportunity to contribute to a culture and then submitting the exercise of 
governmental power to the culture thus formed. Robert Post is one of the 
handful of theorists developing deliberative ideas along these lines. 
Borrowing a distinction of Norberto Bobbio’s between autonomy 
(etymologically “self-law”) and heteronomy (“other-law”), Post argues that 
democratic forms of government are those “in which the laws are made by 
the same people to whom they apply (and for that reason they are 
autonomous norms), while in autocratic forms of government the law-
makers are different from those to whom the laws are addressed (and are 
therefore heteronomous norms).”46  Post therefore asks after the conditions 
in which law is truly made autonomously—“what it means for a people to 
engage in the practice of self-determination.”47 Concluding that 
majoritarian voting procedures are not sufficient,48 he defends deliberative 
democracy’s tradition solution: the authorial ideal. The crucial thing is that 
the people, through deliberation, form a general will that is democratic 
insofar as individual citizens can, on rational grounds, “recognize in that 
sense of the Kantian tradition,” that is, “questions of justice.” Id. at 5.  But I wonder if the real root of 
our disagreement has less to do with our views about the relative priority (and severability) of moral 
questions and ethical ones than with his faith, which seems to me so utterly excessive, in rationalistic 
forms of argument. 
46 Post, supra note 29, at 25–26 (quoting NORBERTO BOBBIO, DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP:
THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF STATE POWER 137 (Peter Kennealy trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1989) 
(1978)). 
47 Id. 
48 I wish Post had written that majoritarian voting procedures are necessary but not sufficient. As 
discussed supra note 30, I think democracy is multifaceted and I worry that democratic theorists tend to 
drift from the (true) proposition that voting is not everything to the (false and extremely dangerous) 
proposition that voting does not matter, or does not matter very much. But Post is ambiguous on the 
matter. See Post, supra note 29, at 25. 
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general will the potentiality of their own authorship.”49 Citizens must be 
able to rationally “experience their government as their own,” to 
“recogniz[e] particular decisions as [their] own,” and to “have the 
warranted conviction that they are engaged in the process of governing 
themselves.”50 
But then, rather than veering into either Habermasian rationalism or 
Rousseauian mysticism,51 Post turns to culture. For the people to have the 
warranted conviction that they are governing themselves, the state’s 
process for making decisions must be “responsive to [the people’s] own 
values and ideas.”52 Participants in the process must, as he continuously 
stresses, not have an “alienated” relationship to the law.53 The process must 
be at once individualistic and communitarian: individualistic so that 
“independent citizens” can “fashion their social order in a manner that 
reflects their values and commitments”54 and communitarian because the 
socialization processes necessary to create independent citizens require 
“healthy and vigorous forms of community life.”55 Speech about matters of 
public and private concern cannot be distinguished in this process “because 
democratic self-governance posits that the people control the agenda of 
government. They have the power to determine the content of public issues 
simply by the direction of their interests.”56 Finally, the goal of the 
deliberative process is “collective self-definition,” which must “precede 
and inform government decision making.”57 For Post, deliberative 
democracy is a chain with two links: from individuals to culture, and from 
culture to government. Individuals project their moral authority as 
members of the community into their culture, and government bows to the 
authority of the culture thus formed. 
49 Post, supra note 29, at 27–28. 
50 Id. at 25–27. 
51 The allusion is to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s famous presentation of how individual wills combine 
to form a general will, which, though a foundation stone in the deliberative tradition, seems to me so 
exaggerated as to be at once metaphysically implausible and, paradoxically, anti-democratic: “If, then, 
we eliminate from the social pact everything that is not essential to it, we find it comes down to this: 
Each one of us puts into the community his person and all his powers under the supreme direction of the 
general will; and as a body, we incorporate every member as an indivisible part of the whole.” JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 61 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) 
(1762) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
52 Post, supra note 29, at 27. 
53 Id. at 26–27, 29. 
54 Robert C. Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of Social Form, in 
DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY 163, 173 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro, eds., 1993). 
55 Id. at 176–78. 
56 Id. at 181. 
57 Id. at 180. 
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Post is a constitutional law scholar and writes that his deliberative, 
authorial, and cultural understanding of democracy reflects “the theory of 
the American First Amendment, which rests on the idea that if citizens are 
free to participate in the formation of public opinion, and if the decisions of 
the state are made responsive to public opinion, citizens will be able to 
experience their government as their own.”58 This culturally oriented 
version of deliberative democracy also flourishes in the theory of copyright 
law, for, like the First Amendment, copyright law provides a legal 
framework for cultural exchange. Yochai Benkler, for example, argues on 
grounds of “democratic participation” that law should protect individuals’ 
ability “to participate in the creation of the cultural meaning of the world 
they occupy.”59 And Jack Balkin—both a constitutional and a copyright 
scholar—argues that human beings are by nature cultural creatures, whose 
interest in “the development of the ideas and meanings that constitute them 
and the communities and subcommunities to which they belong” not only 
includes the political interest in “public deliberation about issues of public 
concern” but extends to the very roots of human flourishing.60 Thus, Balkin 
argues, free speech protects individuals’ right “to participate in the 
production of culture” and protects the cultural sphere itself from 
domination, ensuring that we do not live solely within a culture others 
make for us but instead enjoy “a democratic culture.”61 Perhaps it is 
unsurprising that, where pure philosophers have fallen prey to a 
rationalistic form of deliberative democracy, American legal scholars with 
philosophical leanings have begun to uncover a version of deliberative 
democracy consistent with the American constitutional tradition, and 
therefore both oriented to “We the People” and attuned to the political 
influence of culture in any society grounded in “We the People.” 
In sum, then, the link between democracy and reconstructivism is this: 
reconstructivism’s central claim is that criminal law has a distinctive role to 
58 Post, supra note 29, at 27; see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) 
(explicitly associating the First Amendment with protecting “public discourse”); Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (protecting Jehovah’s Witnesses in distributing religious 
material because “[t]he essential characteristic of these [First Amendment] liberties is, that under their 
shield many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed”); 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (striking down a law that banned communist flags on 
the grounds that “[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that 
government may be responsive to the will of the people . . . is a fundamental principle of our 
constitutional system”). 
59 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 285 (2006). 
60 Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4–5, 34 (2004). 
61 Id. at 4. 
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play in the social world such that, in the vast majority of cases, it is right 
for legal doctrine, governmental practice, and the officials and institutions 
that comprise the criminal system to submit to the moral culture of the 
community wherein they are situated. That is, reconstructivism insists on 
the moral authority of a community’s ethical life in the context of criminal 
law. There is a strain of democratic theory that sees the value of democracy 
itself in such terms—a view for which the normative core of democracy 
has to do with a community’s ability to rationally see itself as the law’s 
author. On this view, democratic government is just the echo in politics of a 
self-defining culture. Reconstructivism is the conception of criminal law 
appropriate to such a conception of democracy. What makes it democratic 
is that it treasures ethical life, subordinates criminal law to ethical life, and 
sees criminal law’s task in terms of the service it does for ethical life. 
III. THREE PRINCIPLES
What would a democratic–reconstructive system of criminal law look 
like? The concept of democracy as community self-authorship is quite 
abstract, as is the concept of criminal justice as normative reconstruction. 
In order to connect these sweeping ideas to concrete policy interventions, 
we need an intermediate level of theory, a set of mid-level principles that 
connect in relatively direct ways to the everyday stuff of legal doctrine, 
practice, and institutional design. 
Normative criminal theory as a field can be, I submit, divided into 
three parts: the theory of criminalization (what conduct should constitute a 
crime?); the theory of punishment (what principles should guide the type 
and extent of punishment meted out for crimes?); and the theory of 
criminal procedure (what principles should guide the administration and 
enforcement of criminal law?). The theory of punishment has received such 
disproportionate attention that it is sometimes confused with the field as a 
whole—as if “punishment theory” and “criminal theory” were the same 
thing—but these three branches are in fact distinct. If a theory of criminal 
justice aspires to be complete or comprehensive, as reconstructivism does, 
it must speak to each of them. And it is at the level of these three branches 
that policy-guiding principles can be seen. 
I would therefore like to propose three principles, each entailed by 
democratic–reconstructivism, one to govern each of the three branches of 
the field: the moral culture principle of criminalization, the principle of 
prosocial punishment, and the “We the People” principle of criminal 
procedure. 
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A. The Moral Culture Principle of Criminalization
The moral culture principle of criminalization holds that the only 
conduct that may justly be criminalized is conduct that violates and 
expressively attacks the values on which a community’s social organization 
is based, unless the merits of criminalizing another type of conduct are so 
great as to substantially outweigh the harm criminalizing it does to those 
same community values. 
The moral culture principle thus has both an affirmative, justificatory 
dimension and a negative, prohibitory dimension, neither of which is 
wholly mandatory. To start on the affirmative side, note that the moral 
culture principle indicates (albeit by suggestion) what forms of 
criminalization we might favor: we have good reason to criminalize where 
doing so hinders a hindrance to the values undergirding the social order.62 
After all, a good theory of criminalization should favor criminalizing 
something, and most uncontroversially criminal conduct fits the description 
of an attack on the values undergirding the social order: as mentioned 
above, thefts attack norms of property, burglaries deny the security of the 
home, domestic violence attacks victims’ physical integrity and equality. 
But the principle does not require criminalizing every attack on shared 
norms because it recognizes that our good reasons to criminalize may be 
overridden by other values. The conduct in question may be minor or 
private in ways a free society should overlook, or crucially, the challenge to 
the established order may be part of the deliberative process by which 
society can or should change. In particular, a great deal of speech, 
assembly, and religious heterodoxy attacks the normative order of society 
in ways necessary for a free society to grow. The First Amendment can 
usefully be understood as an anti-criminalization provision—indeed, 
historically it has often functioned as an anti-criminalization provision—
freeing up a sphere of normative challenge and norm entrepreneurship 
outside the reach of criminal law. Furthermore, in the United States, 
tolerating speech that challenges shared moral culture is, paradoxically, 
part of shared moral culture. Crafted under the sign of deliberative 
democracy, the moral culture principle does not criminalize in this sphere. 
In its negative, prohibitory dimension, the moral culture principle 
protects conduct from criminalization where that conduct is part of a 
community’s way of life. Going to school, getting a job, getting a drink, 
playing a sport—these things cannot be criminalized in our culture because 
62 I am cribbing Kant’s phrase that we should coerce only as a “hindering of a hindrance to 
freedom.” IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 6:231, at 25 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797) (emphasis omitted). 
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they are part of what our ethical life consists in. To do otherwise, to 
criminalize elements of ethical life itself, would contradict the very purpose 
for which criminal law exists. Yet due to the “unless” clause, this 
prohibitory part of the principle may be overridden too: it is a strong but 
defeasible presumption, not an absolute. As discussed at length in other 
work, I think there are situations so extreme that criminalizing in the face 
of a recalcitrant culture makes sense even on reconstructive grounds.63 
Reconstructive theory is finally grounded in human flourishing and thus 
has the wherewithal without internal inconsistency to acknowledge 
situations in which preserving moral culture is itself contrary to human 
flourishing. As the “unless” clause also highlights, however, even in such 
cases one must recognize the costs such criminalization exacts in the 
currency of social solidarity. 
Taken together, these positive and negative elements of the moral 
culture principle would make the conduct labeled “crime” truly—by its 
very nature—antisocial. That term can sound almost quaint in 
contemporary ears, but that is only because contemporary patterns of 
criminalization have drifted so very far from what crime, on a 
reconstructivist view, should be. Our criminal legislation at present reflects 
no principle but that crime is whatever the legislature says it is—a principle 
of pure positivism based on a view of the criminal instrument in terms of 
pure expediency. One way of understanding the moral culture principle is 
to see it as holding that criminal law should almost never be purely 
positivistic. Criminal law should be codified customary law. If it is custom 
in the community to drive sixty miles per hour on the highway, then it 
cannot justly be made a crime to drive over forty miles per hour. If it is 
custom in the community for friends to smoke marijuana together, then 
smoking marijuana should at most be the subject of civil or administrative 
control, not criminal. If the community has not arrived at a functional 
consensus that taking copyright-protected (but nonrival) intellectual 
property is the moral equivalent of theft, then copyright felonies should not 
exist. The principle is radical insofar as it profoundly departs from current 
practice, but it is conservative in the Burkean sense that it defers to the 
evolved wisdom embedded in the practices of a functioning society. What 
is genuinely radical in contemporary American criminal law (but hard to 
see because it is so close) is how instrumental our ways of using the 
63 Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 1, at 1560–61 (terming this stance of restraint, of not 
using the criminal instrument against a community’s ethical life except in extreme cases, “criminal law 
Thayerianism” based on James Bradley Thayer’s view of judicial review: strike down a statute only if 
its unconstitutionality is “so clear that it is not open to rational question” (quoting James B. Thayer, The 
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893))). 
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criminal law have become—how readily we have set aside the tradition of 
restricting criminal law to widely recognized and highly culpable 
wrongdoing and come to accept patterns of expanding criminalization for 
no better reason than that criminal law is a useful tool for social control that 
can be enlisted against anything we wish to curb. Burke is radical in a 
Benthamite world. The moral culture principle insists that criminal law is 
generally the wrong instrument to put at the front of cultural change, and it 
points criminal law away from purely instrumental uses, away from the 
project of sheer social control, toward the more cautious project of cultural 
maintenance. 
The moral culture principle is thus meant to compete with a utilitarian 
and positivistic principle of criminalization based on pure expediency. It is 
also meant to compete with the most visible alternative to utilitarian 
expediency in the discourse on criminalization, that is, John Stuart Mill’s 
harm principle: “[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others.”64 The harm principle is not democratic at all; it is 
liberal in a libertarian sense. Imagine a society in which selling organs 
clearly would attack and threaten the social order—by suggesting that the 
body is nonsacred, for example, or that the bodies of the poor are for sale to 
the rich. The harm principle in that society would refuse to criminalize 
provided the transaction were consensual. Imagine another society in which 
selling organs were taken to attack and threaten the social order in some 
cases and not others—perhaps when the organs in question would cost the 
seller his or her life, but not otherwise. The harm principle would still 
refuse to criminalize; the differences between societies one and two just 
wouldn’t matter, because the views of the people comprising those 
societies wouldn’t matter. Imagine a third society in which the extant 
values were sufficiently individualistic and market-oriented that it would be 
no threat to society’s values to buy and sell organs at will. The harm 
principle there would contingently be consistent with the values of the 
people within that society, but the fact that people held those views still 
wouldn’t matter. As long as “harm” carries its ordinary meaning, the harm 
principle is incapable of responding to the convictions of the people whose 
criminal law it aspires to direct. This indifference is improper. It is 
undemocratic; it hinders experimentation and social discovery (woe be to 
the community saddled with the harm principle if, empirically, the 
principle turns out to have bad effects); and it disables criminal law’s 
64 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 80 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 
2003) (1859). Note that Mill's followers have developed this principle in a more rigidly libertarian, less 
culturally oriented way than Mill himself does in On Liberty. 
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capacity to accomplish an essential social function, namely, reconstructing 
a violated normative order. I also think, though this would require a much 
more extensive argument, that the harm principle’s policy implications are 
often unsound. Celebrated as it is, the harm principle is not the answer to 
overcriminalization. 
The moral culture principle is thus a third way—a principled 
justification for and constraint on criminalization that is not utilitarian, that 
is not the harm principle, and that is consistent with the democratic goal of 
enabling the community to rationally see itself as the author of its laws. 
B. The Principle of Prosocial Punishment
The principle of prosocial punishment holds that criminal punishment 
should aim, both expressively and functionally, to protect, repair, and 
reconstruct the normative order violated by a crime while at the same time 
minimizing the damage to the normative order caused by punishment itself. 
The prosocial punishment principle has a great deal in common with 
the relatively familiar expressive conception of punishment. Like the 
expressive conception of punishment, the prosocial punishment principle 
centrally includes using the expressive qualities of punishment to condemn 
a crime, affirm the social norm violated by the crime, and affirm the dignity 
of any victim or victims of the crime. But the principle of prosocial 
punishment carries a different range of implications than the expressive 
conception of punishment, for two reasons. 
First, while the expressive conception of punishment merely notes that 
punishment has expressive qualities and uses those qualities to send 
condemnatory messages, the principle of prosocial punishment wields 
punishment’s expressive qualities in the service of a distinctive and well-
defined goal: reconstructing ethical life.65 This goal makes the principle of 
prosocial punishment sensitive to something merely expressive punishment 
is not, namely, the ways in which punishment itself might send messages 
that tear the social fabric. Consider the effect on society’s normative order 
of torturing offenders as a form of punishment. The ordinary objection is 
that torture violates the human rights of the offender. Reconstructivism 
65 In Reconstructivism, I argue that expressivism 
is so thin that it is not really a comprehensive theory of punishment or criminal law at all. . . . 
One could be both an expressivist and a liberal utilitarian . . . . One could also be both an 
expressivist and a retributivist . . . . This mixing and matching is not theoretical confusion: it 
results from the fact that expressivism without further specification makes no claims about the 
ultimate grounds of punishment, whether justice, welfare, or whatever else. Expressivism is a 
building block to be used in various theories of punishment as appropriate. 
Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 1, at 1533. 
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observes that torturing an offender would also have collateral effects on the 
prevailing moral culture. A community that tortures as punishment is one 
in which a set of Enlightenment humanist values related to the infliction of 
pain will be unable to take hold of the culture or will lose their cultural 
grip. Torturing thieves, for example, might succeed in affirming society’s 
commitment to property rights, but in so doing it would undermine a series 
of collateral values that are also necessary to maintaining social life. 
Torturing thieves would also damage the emotional basis of social life, 
especially if anyone in the society loves the offender or cares about others 
like the offender. 
In pointing out the ways in which punishment itself might send 
messages that damage the social fabric, the principle of prosocial 
punishment gets at something that I think is quite fundamental to 
understanding what has gone wrong in American criminal punishment 
today. As I have argued at length in past work:  
Implicit in American punishment is the idea that serious or repeat offenses 
mark the offenders as morally deformed people rather than ordinary people 
who have committed crimes. Offenders’ criminality is thus both immutable 
and devaluing: it is a feature of the actor, rather than merely the act, and, as 
such, it diminishes offenders’ claim to membership in the community and 
loosens offenders’ grip on certain basic rights.66 
That is a profoundly antisocial message.67 Notice the irony: it is crime that 
is supposed to be antisocial. The principle of prosocial punishment is 
fundamentally just that: the claim that punishment should be prosocial—
that punishment should truly be crime’s antithesis. That is the logic of the 
call-and-response that is crime and punishment on a reconstructive view. It 
is all but the opposite of what America presently does. 
The principle of prosocial punishment, like the moral culture principle 
of criminalization, thus has both an affirmative, justificatory dimension and 
a negative, prohibitory dimension. Affirmatively, the principle means that 
punishment must be of such a form and such severity as is necessary to 
overcome culturally the message of the crime. In its negative, prohibitory 
dimension, the principle means that punishment cannot itself become 
antisocial, cannot itself express norms contrary to maintaining shared 
ethical life. The observation spurring punishment theory since its 
philosophical inception is the anomaly of a community dedicated to the 
well-being of its members making the infliction of suffering its end. That is 
66 Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 941 (2016). 
67 The twofold normative conclusion of Two Cultures is (1) the critique of American punishment 
for having become antisocial and (2) the affirmative principle that emerges from that critique: the 
principle of prosocial punishment. See id. at 1036. 
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why punishment seems to require special justification. Reconstructivism 
takes a distinctive view of this root problem. To a reconstructivist, because 
punishment does indeed make the infliction of suffering its end, it presents 
an expressive conundrum. Punishment does not just have the capacity to 
undermine collateral social norms; it has a genetic tendency to do so, at 
least in any society dedicated to the well-being of its members. Punishment 
theory as we know it begins at the very dawn of the Enlightenment because 
the idea that societies should be dedicated to the well-being of their 
members was the foundation of the Enlightenment political thought. 
Punishment is pulled by its nature to expressively disaffirm the norms on 
which social life is built, even as it affirms the norms violated by the crime. 
The fundamental challenge of punishment is thus to take action against 
offenders sufficient to deny the messages of their crimes without thereby 
undermining collateral norms. The principle of prosocial punishment 
centers on that challenge. 
The second reason the principle of prosocial punishment is different 
than the expressive conception of punishment is that—with roots in 
communitarian consequentialism—the prosocial punishment principle 
recognizes punishment’s practical, nonexpressive functions. If 
punishment’s purpose is to restitch a torn social fabric, and the risk it courts 
is the risk of becoming antisocial itself, expressivism is not the only thing 
that matters. For example, imprisonment tends to damage families, insofar 
as it takes parents (usually fathers) away from their spouses and children. 
Any communitarian theory of criminal law should care about avoiding 
broken families, which gives reconstructivists good reason to favor 
noncarceral sanctions when possible and imprisonment close to families 
with generous visiting conditions otherwise. Reconstructivism endorses 
rehabilitative programming within prisons, opportunities and requirements 
to perform useful work, and physical safety from emotionally scarring and 
criminogenic conditions, because those sorts of features within prisons 
have prosocial effects after offenders are released. For the same reason, 
reconstructivism opposes collateral consequences that prevent offenders 
from returning to the social fold upon release, such as bars to employment. 
Reconstructivism also endorses restorative justice proceedings insofar as 
those proceedings recognize that crimes commonly damage interpersonal 
relationships and aim to repair those relationships. And reconstructivism is 
sensitive to the ways in which punishment’s pervasiveness in certain 
communities, particularly poor, urban, African-American communities, 
damages the capacity of those communities to function in ways that support 
human flourishing. Indeed, as a sociological and communitarian theory, 
reconstructivism does not evaluate punishment merely in the individual 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1482 
instance, but rather understands punishment as a cumulative practice with 
cumulative sociological effects. Reconstructivism thus recognizes special 
sociological risks in patterns of punishment, even where many or most of 
the individual instances of punishment making up the pattern are justified. 
Many of these practical proposals push for a milder form of 
punishment than the United States now has, and one might wonder if the 
principle of prosocial punishment is necessarily mild—perhaps just a way 
of expressing philosophically the revulsion toward punishment that seems 
to animate, for example, many theorists of restorative justice.68 The answer 
is no: the principle of prosocial punishment is not so one-sided. It 
condemns the wrong and insists on forms of punishment severe enough to 
be read within the culture as genuinely condemnatory. Light sentences for 
serious offenders are wrong: they diminish both the norm and, if there is 
one, the victim that the offender assailed. James Whitman has written that 
we should return to the mild, individualizing, and rehabilitative era of 
punishment that prevailed in the middle of the twentieth century, which he 
terms the era of “penal modernism.”69 I suspect that the era of penal 
modernism was, if not as bad as the present, at least bad in its own way. 
The principle of prosocial punishment counsels mildness in the context of 
contemporary American punishment only because American punishment 
today is both extraordinarily severe and severe in ways that are 
counterproductive from the standpoint of restitching the social fabric. We 
expressively exclude and degrade offenders, and then we pragmatically 
exclude and degrade them, creating conditions that make ex-cons a 
permanent underclass. Our fundamental failure is not that we are harsh but 
that we are harsh in antisocial ways. 
Criminal law judges, lawyers, and teachers, philosophical punishment 
theorists, and penal codes themselves commonly list four justifications for 
punishment: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. 
Some include a fifth: expressive condemnation. There should be a fifth 
principle, but it should be a different fifth principle than “expressive 
condemnation.” The five should be: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, 
incapacitation, and normative reconstruction, where the last is understood 
according to the principle of prosocial punishment. That means punishment 
should not only be expressive, and should not only express condemnation, 
but should expressively and pragmatically reconstruct society’s normative 
order in the wake of a crime. 
68 Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 1, at 1522. 
69 James Q. Whitman, The Case for Penal Modernism: Beyond Utility and Desert, 1 CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS L. 143 (2014). 
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C. The “We the People” Principle of Criminal Procedure
The “We the People” principle of criminal procedure holds that the 
administration and enforcement of criminal law should be by and of the 
people—that is, solidaristic, public, embedded in local communities, 
primarily value rational rather than instrumentally or formally rational,70 
primarily under lay rather than official control, open to particularized and 
equitable acts of moral judgment, and seen by a democratic polity as 
procedurally legitimate. In short, the “We the People” principle holds that 
the values and the principles of institutional design undergirding the “We 
the People” formula in the U.S. Constitution should be the normative center 
of criminal procedure. 
To understand what the “We the People” principle would mean in 
practice, it helps to see how profoundly the American procedural system 
has drifted away from it. The long arc of criminal procedure’s development 
has been toward ever-greater degrees of Weberian bureaucratization. As 
Weber presented it, bureaucratization’s defining features are the 
displacement of the laity by a professional corps of officials and experts; 
the use of technical expertise and rule-based administration in place of 
individualized moral judgment; and the triumph of instrumental rationality 
(that is, trying to attain a given set of ends as efficiently as possible) over 
value rationality (that is, trying to live in accord with a system of values).71 
It is remarkable how closely these three features track the history of 
criminal procedure. The professionalized corps of officials that define the 
modern world of criminal procedure—police forces, full-time prosecutors, 
and public defenders—emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.72 
Trials, which were once relatively brief, informal affairs involving ordinary 
language and moral judgment, evolved gradually into the formal, rule-
bound, lawyer-controlled factual inquiry they are today.73 Even 
constitutional doctrine in criminal procedure has come to have a 
bureaucratic orientation. Lawyers and judges since the start of the Warren 
Court’s procedural revolution have treated the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments as tools, under the control of the professional legal 
community, by which to produce rules with instrumental ends: policing the 
police, controlling racial injustice, safeguarding individuals against abuses 
70 This distinction comes from Max Weber. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE
OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 24–26, 85–86 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et 
al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1922); see also Kleinfeld, Manifesto, supra note 38, at 1379–80.  
71 Supra note 70. 
72 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27–30, 67–68, 149, 
245 (1993). 
73 See id. at 25, 245–50. 
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of state power, aiding law enforcement in arresting and prosecuting the 
guilty, and keeping the system reasonably efficient.  
But these examples pale next to the paradigm case of 
bureaucratization, which is also the most important development in 
American criminal procedure’s modern history: the displacement of the 
jury trial by plea bargaining. Doctrinally, plea bargaining turns chiefly on 
two things: the Supreme Court’s view of the right to trial by jury in purely 
individual terms (not as reflecting an interest of the community in the case 
but as reflecting a defendant’s individual and therefore waivable right to a 
jury trial)74 and the Court’s willingness to allow prosecutors immense 
discretion in the bargaining process for the sake of managing large 
caseloads and securing convictions rapidly and cheaply.75 Both doctrinal 
developments satisfy bureaucratic imperatives of processing cases 
efficiently and violate the “We the People” principle by excluding the lay 
community from the criminal process. 
Indeed, the “We the People” principle suggests a distinctive 
interpretation of what plea bargaining is and what is wrong with it. From a 
democratic–reconstructive perspective, the criminal jury trial in the 
Founding Era is best understood as an institution the essence of which was 
to subordinate state power and state officials to the authority of a local 
laity and to empower that laity to deliberate in equitable, prudential, and 
particularistic ways. In turn, plea bargaining is best understood as an 
institutional arrangement the essence of which is to excise the laity from the 
administration of criminal justice, empowering state officials and other 
legal professionals to exercise control on the basis of the rule-oriented and 
instrumental reasoning characteristic of bureaucratic governance. The 
very idea of bargaining over justice—negotiating charge and sentence in 
order to reduce the risks and costs of trial rather than evaluating the 
blameworthiness of an act of wrongdoing that breaches community 
norms—shifts criminal justice as a system from equitable particularism to 
instrumental rationality, from “morality play” to “machine,” as Stephanos 
Bibas has memorably put it.76 
74 See Laura I Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 440 (2009) 
(“The idea that jury trial rights meant community rights held sway until at least the mid-nineteenth 
century. . . . The jury trial right, particularly the criminal jury trial right, was almost entirely predicated 
on validating the community’s right to propound moral judgments on local citizens, and little concerned 
with the defendant’s individual rights and liberties.”). 
75 See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752–53 (1970) (holding that large sentencing 
discounts and threats of death do not prove coercion in plea bargaining and noting that “with the 
avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved”). 
76 STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2012). 
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And what is wrong with that? The typical complaint about plea 
bargaining is that it is coercive, but from a democratic–reconstructive 
perspective, the bigger problem is that plea bargaining could not be worse 
at accomplishing reconstructive ends if it were designed to thwart them. 
Plea bargaining is very good at processing as many offenders as possible 
for as little money as possible. It is utterly unsuited to building social 
solidarity around a community’s commitment to the norm violated by the 
crime—exactly the thing criminal law on a reconstructive perspective 
exists to do. In plea bargaining, the community is absent from both the jury 
box and the courtroom, the solidaristic effect of the morality play is gone, 
the violated norm is just a legal infraction, the norm’s significance to the 
community is just one consideration in the bargain, and the expressive 
features of the whole affair are secondary to getting the case processed. The 
result enables the criminal system to move more offenders from street to 
prison than it ever could on a “We the People” approach, but what it 
sacrifices in so doing is the opportunity to reconstruct a violated normative 
order in the eyes of the community. Per Bibas: “[R]eforms may reduce the 
aggregate amount of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation that the 
system can mete out. But sometimes it is worth sacrificing quantity for 
quality.”77 The fundamental problem with plea bargaining from a 
democratic–reconstructive standpoint is that it is a procedure optimized for 
the wrong goal. The “We the People” principle would not require getting 
rid of it wholesale but would require sharply reducing it. 
Plea bargaining is one example, albeit a paradigmatic example, of the 
degree to which the “We the People” principle would, by re-centering 
criminal procedure in democratic ways, work revolutionary changes in the 
present procedural system. What is interesting is that these changes are 
revolutionary only from the perspective of the present: the “We the People” 
principle is more faithful to the Founders’ Constitution than the last half 
century of criminal procedure has been. Of the various competing goals 
that presently orient Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment doctrine—
policing the police, controlling racial injustice, unburdening law 
enforcement, keeping the system reasonably efficient, and safeguarding 
individual rights—the first four are utterly anachronistic and the last is 
misunderstood. The criminal justice system that emerged from the Anti-
Federalists’ battles with the Federalists in the Founding Era was above all 
majoritarian and populist; the institutional design had more to do with 
enabling majorities to rule themselves than with safeguarding individual 
rights. Indeed, criminal law itself was conceptualized in the Founding Era 
77 Id. at xxvii. 
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in political terms rather than individualistic ones. It is not too much to say 
that the “We the People” principle was the principle animating the criminal 
procedure amendments in the Founders’ Constitution. To say that is not to 
insist on some form of originalism. It is merely to argue that the “We the 
People” principle is in a residual sense part of our law, however much it 
would alter our present procedural system. 
IV. THE PRESENT CRISIS
If the above three principles are sound, then what is principally wrong 
with American criminal justice has to do with the ways in which the 
present system has turned away from democratic–reconstructive ordering 
in all three of the major departments of criminal justice. We criminalize in 
purely positivistic ways that aim for sheer social control, directing the 
criminal instrument to norms over which there is no community custom or 
consensus. We punish in ways that say to criminals and the people who 
love or identify with them: “You (or the person you care about) are 
permanently evil or dangerous, a ruined being, forever outside the 
community of the law-abiding.” And we administer and enforce the law in 
ways that put the criminal system entirely in the hands of bureaucratic 
professionals reasoning in formal and instrumental ways rather than 
equitable and value-oriented ways. 
How did we get here? The dominant narrative of our criminal justice 
system is that it is dysfunctional because the American voter is vengeful, 
violent, racist, ill-informed, stupid.78 This persistent narrative is one of the 
deepest obstacles to democratic–reconstructive reform—a false picture that 
grips the mind because it is just true enough to get people to overlook its 
flaws and because it fits so effortlessly into a preexisting set of 
expectations many people, particularly among the intelligentsia, bring to 
American public life. We came to this dysfunctional present, the dominant 
narrative insists, through popular referenda, moralism about drugs, and a 
race to the bottom in which voters demanded harshness and politicians won 
office to the extent they supplied it. The solution then is to get the public 
off the field and leave criminal justice in the hands of responsible officials 
and experts. 
But notice what a poor fit that narrative is with the nature of the 
problems just discussed. With respect to criminalization, the very problem 
with the law is how much everyday conduct it covers. That is not the 
normal result of political pressure from the American public. As Bill Stuntz 
has written: “[C]ontemporary criminal codes cover a good deal of marginal 
78 See Kleinfeld, Manifesto, supra note 38, at 1398. 
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middle-class misbehavior—a very odd state of affairs, politically 
speaking.”79 What really drives American overcriminalization, Stuntz 
argued, is not “[s]urface politics, the sphere in which public opinion and 
partisan argument operate,” which “ebb and flow, just as crime rates ebb 
and flow,” and which often “push toward broader liability, but not always, 
and not always to the same degree,” but a “deeper politics, a politics of 
institutional competition and cooperation,” which “always pushes toward 
broader liability rules.”80 The key to American criminal law’s expansion, 
Stuntz thought, is not voters but prosecutors, who have an interest in broad 
criminalization (among other things because it greases the wheels of plea 
bargaining) and who effectively lobby legislatures for it.81 Legislators too 
have an interest in accommodating prosecutors because broad criminal law 
that is rarely enforced makes crime control cheap.82 The American public 
might be implicated indirectly insofar as they create a tough-on-crime 
atmosphere that makes legislators receptive to prosecutors’ wishes. But the 
story is not a simple one of lay citizens in black hats and officials in white. 
The procedural case is even more dramatic. The American public is 
likely unaware that plea bargaining has replaced the criminal jury trial and 
would probably be dismayed to discover that fact. It was not lay citizens 
that did away with the trial, but legal insiders—prosecutors, judges, even 
public defenders—acting on their interests, and indeed acting to exclude 
lay citizens from participating.83 That is to say, the single most important 
development in the modern history of American criminal procedure, and it 
seems empirically a major contributor to mass incarceration,84 was not 
79 Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 22, at 509. 
80 Id. at 510 (emphasis original). 
81 Id. at 510, 519–20, 534–38. 
82 See id. at 550–52. 
83 As George Fisher has argued in the leading history of plea bargaining: 
By [the nineteenth] century’s end, all three of the courtroom’s major actors—prosecutor, 
defendant, and judge—had found reasons to favor the plea bargaining regime. For prosecutor 
and judge, who together held most of the power that mattered, the spread of plea bargaining did 
not merely deliver marvelously efficient relief from a suffocating workload. It also spared the 
prosecutor the risk of loss and the judge the risk of reversal, and thereby protected the 
professional reputation of each. 
GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 16 (2003). The twentieth century added another insider 
constituency to plea bargaining’s supporters: “plea bargaining played a surprisingly direct role in 
assisting the creation of public defenders’ offices,” which “share[d] the prosecutor’s and judge’s 
interests in maximizing systemic efficiency—and hence in plea bargaining.” Id. at 17. The triumph of 
plea bargaining is thus a story of “powers and interests.” Id. at 16. Indeed, plea bargaining’s triumph is 
a story of “the power of the courtier,” who gains influence “by serving well the interests of those in 
high places.” Id. at 175. 
84 See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO 
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 72–77, 133 (2017). 
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voters’ doing. Now, again, perhaps the American public contributed by 
demanding a tough-on-crime approach that encouraged plea bargaining’s 
excesses. But the decision to embrace plea bargaining as an institution, and 
the many thousands of individual case dispositions through plea 
bargaining, trace back to legal insiders. 
The dominant narrative is at its strongest with respect to punishment. 
The American public in the era of high crime did indeed demand severe 
punishment. But even there, the case is not simple. American crime policy 
was lenient for most of the country’s history; voters did not demand tough-
on-crime policies before the mid-century crime wave, and seem to be 
moving toward greater leniency now that the crime wave has subsided.85 
There is also evidence of harshness on the other side. Some of the pressure 
for long sentences, for example, has come from prosecutors indulging a 
punitive temperament or seeking leverage for plea bargains.86 Another 
source of harshness has been the sentencing guidelines, which are the 
apotheosis of bureaucratic ordering. And even in cases that seem to 
exemplify the public’s punitive excess—inordinate sentences under three 
strikes laws for stealing golf clubs87 or videotapes,88 for example—it is 
worth bearing in mind that groups of prosecutors acting on an 
organizational basis had to file those charges and defend them on appeal, 
and a series of judges had to agree not to strike them down despite the 
Eighth Amendment’s invitation to do so. Ordinary people are surprised and 
appalled by the cases precisely because the sentences offend ordinary 
sensibilities—precisely because that sort of excess is not what voters meant 
three strikes laws to do. 
My point is not that the American public is wholly innocent and 
American officials wholly to blame for the criminal system’s present 
harshness and dysfunction. The public did clamor for harshness in the late 
twentieth century. Furthermore, racism has undeniably contributed to the 
American criminal system’s particular oppressiveness to black people, as 
well as to other minorities. My point is that the dominant narrative is much 
too simple. It overstates the degree to which voters gave rise to the present 
crisis. It dramatically understates the degree to which legal insiders and 
other bureaucratic forces contributed to the present crisis. And, above all, it 
does not adequately consider the routes by which change is likely to come.  
85 Kleinfeld, Manifesto, supra note 38, at 1377–78 & n.29; Kleinfeld, Two Cultures, supra note 66, 
at 935–39, 987–91, 996. 
86 Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 22, at 510, 519–20, 537–38. 
87 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
88 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
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As I have argued in past work,89 my view is that the American 
criminal justice system’s present harshness and dysfunction are the product 
of a toxic combination of popular fear and anger in an era of extremely 
high crime and a bureaucratic, instrumentalist approach to getting crime 
under control for minimal cost. But the popular anger is changeable: 
America was the leading example of penal mildness in the Western world 
from the 1770s through the early 1970s, and we have seen with the recent 
downtick in crime a resurgent movement toward mildness. What the 
history chiefly shows is that the American public turned to harshness 
during an era of soaring crime, which is unsurprising and not unreasonable, 
but that Americans are not relentlessly harsh: rather, they have the capacity 
for harshness but also for mildness and they respond to circumstances. The 
point is not just historical: moralistic patterns of thought have a propensity 
for changing register, shifting—sometimes quite suddenly—from punitive 
condemnation to equally moralistic but more forgiving ideas of 
compassion, dignity, and love. 90 
The other force standing behind American penal harshness and 
dysfunction, however, is a professional criminal justice community 
oriented above all to controlling crime as efficiently as possible. Lacking 
effective tools for rehabilitation, this approach leads to incapacitative forms 
of social exclusion just as pernicious as the moralistic anger, but less 
subject to change. The professional criminal justice community also has a 
disturbing set of interests and incentives—for example, the prosecutorial 
interest in broad, severe criminal codes (in order to secure easy plea 
bargains), the legislative interest in cheap crime control (which also favors 
broad, severe penal codes, as well as under-resourced and therefore brutal 
prisons), or the administrative interest in extensive regulatory criminal law 
(in order to secure compliance with the administrative state). These patterns 
of thought and incentives do not easily change and show no signs of 
slackening with the recent downtick in crime. 
89 Kleinfeld, Two Cultures, supra note 66. 
90 For example, John DiIulio—who became famous in 1996 for his book endorsing harsh sentences 
for juvenile “super-predators”—had, while praying at mass on Palm Sunday of that very year, “‘an 
epiphany—a conversion of heart, a conversion of mind,’ in which it ‘just became crystal clear to me . . . 
that for the rest of my life I would work on prevention, on helping bring caring, responsible adults to 
wrap their arms around these kids.’” Id. at 1030 (quoting Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young 
‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has Regrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2001), http://nyti.ms/1D36YpA 
[https://perma.cc/H95D-RQ2B]). Or witness the profound moralism at work in Europe’s penal 
mildness, which was sponsored in Germany chiefly by churches, and which the European Court of 
Human Rights today enforces aggressively, frequently, and consistently in terms of human dignity and 
other morally charged terms. Id. at 951–55, 1000–02, 1033–35. 
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In short, the democratic impulse to anger is changeable and has a 
pronounced tendency to give way to democratic mercy. The bureaucratic 
desire for control really is relentless. It is time to try democracy. 
